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Ronald Coase, who died on Labor Day at age 102, was one of the most
unusual economists of the 20th century. He won the Nobel Prize in
1991 for his insights about how transactions costs affect real-world
economies. In a 75-year career he wrote only about a dozen significant















United States from his native Britain in 1931 and 1932, he dropped in
on perennial Socialist Party presidential candidate Norman Thomas,
and he visited Ford and General Motors. How, he wondered, could
economists say that Lenin was wrong to believe that the Russian
economy could be run like one big factory, when some big firms in the
U.S. seemed to run well?
Coase's answer, in his widely cited 1937 article "The Nature of the
Firm": Companies are like centrally planned economies, but unlike
the latter, they are formed because of people's voluntary choices. But
why do people make these choices? Coase wrote that the answer is
"marketing costs," or what economists now call "transaction costs." If
markets were costless to use, there would be no point in forming




The Man Who Resisted 'Blackboard
Economics'
Nobel laureate Ronald Coase taught that economists should study real markets.
Sept. 3, 2013 6:45 p.m. ET
By DAVID R. HENDERSON
Ronald Coase BLOOMBERG NEWS
8/17/15, 10:52 AMDavid Henderson: The Man Who Resisted 'Blackboard Economics' - WSJ
Page 2 of 3http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324432404579053032911966114
companies. Instead, people would make arm's-length transactions.
But because markets are costly to use, the most efficient production
process often takes place within a company. His explanation of why
companies exist spawned a whole literature.
His 1960 article "The Problem of Social Cost" gave rise to the field
called "law and economics." Before Coase, most economists had
accepted British economist Arthur Pigou's idea that if, say, a cattle
rancher's cows destroy his neighboring farmer's crops, the
government should stop the rancher from letting his cattle roam free
or tax him for doing so. Otherwise the cattle would continue to
destroy crops because the rancher would have no incentive to stop
them.
Coase challenged that view. The rancher, he wrote, would be ignoring
an opportunity: the chance to be paid by the farmer not to destroy the
crops. If transaction costs were zero—Coase was clear that he wasn't
assuming they were—the farmer and rancher could come to a
mutually beneficial agreement.
For example, if the rancher's net return on a steer was $20, then the
rancher would accept some amount over $20 to give up the additional
steer. If the steer was doing harm worth $30 to the crops, then the
farmer would be willing to pay the rancher up to $30 not to raise the
steer. So the case for Pigou's taxation was no longer so clear.
George Stigler, who won the 1982 Nobel Prize in economics, thought
the exciting part of Coase's insight was what happened when
transactions costs were zero. Stigler labeled that insight the "Coase
Theorem." If transactions costs were zero, no government
intervention was needed.
Deirdre McCloskey, an economist at the University of Illinois at
Chicago Circle, thought the no-transactions-cost insight was trivial.
The interesting part, according to Ms. McCloskey, is what happens
when reality intrudes in the form of positive transactions costs. Then
it matters how courts assign liability. If, in the above example, a court
gave a rancher the right but the rancher valued the steer at less than
the damages to the farmer's crop, transactions costs could prevent the
efficient solution from emerging.
Coase himself rejected both the Stigler view (that zero transactions
costs are the important case) and the Pigou view, both of which he
derisively called "blackboard economics."
Another famous Coase article, "The Lighthouse in Economics," was
published in 1974. Economists often use lighthouses as an example of
a public good that only government can provide. But Coase showed,
with a detailed look at history, that lighthouses in 19th-century
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Britain were privately provided and that ships were charged for their
use when they came into port. There were ships that didn't come into
port, but enough did to make lighthouses a paying proposition.
Coase's investigation undermined economists' previous view that the
free-rider problem would put the kibosh on for-profit lighthouses. It
also strengthened his view that economists needed to study real
markets rather than settling for blackboard economics.
In 1959, Coase wrote that the Federal Communications Commission
was unnecessary; electromagnetic spectrum could be bought and sold
in a free market. There was nothing special about the scarcity of
spectrum, since all economic goods are scarce. This view was derided
at the time, but is now almost standard fare among economists.
As editor of the Journal of Law and Economics from 1964 to 1982,
Coase published articles that were critical of government regulation.
Not, Coase emphasized, because regulation could not work but
because, in virtually all the cases examined in that journal, regulation
did not work. Regulation led either to cartels or to other negative
effects.
Coase made many intellectuals uncomfortable by pointing out an
obvious implication of their belief in government regulation: If
regulation works so well in the market for goods, then it should work
even better in the market for ideas.
Why? As Coase said in a 1997 Reason interview, "It's easier for people
to discover that they have a bad can of peaches than it is for them to
discover that they have a bad idea." Many intellectuals thought Coase
was arguing for government regulation of ideas. He wasn't. His point
was to get intellectuals to see that their case for regulating goods is
weak.
Mr. Henderson teaches economics at the Naval Postgraduate School in
Monterey, Calif., and is a research fellow at Stanford University's
Hoover Institution.
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